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Abstract
In this paper, panel data from 15 OECD countries (1971-1990) are used to test the hypothesis
that differences in monetary and labour market institutions explain a significant portion of the
surprisingly diverse inflation and unemployment experiences among similarly developed
economies. As an alternative to the measures of  centralization of wage bargaining and
corporatism used in previous studies, a Hefindahl index of union concentration is used as a
proxy for the degree of coordination failure extant in wage setting. Additional explanatory
variables used include union density, union coverage and the level of wage bargaining. We
observe that inflation has a hump-shaped relationship with central bank independence and
union density, as well as a negative relationship with union concentration, while
unemployment has a U-shaped relationship with union density, and a hump-shaped
relationship with union concentration and central bank independence. These findings are
largely robust to the use of alternative estimators and assumptions on the structure of the error
term. Further results are obtained from stratifying the sample by central bank independence
and union concentration. These are then compared with the contrasting predictions of two
recent theoretical models. Finally, we show that high union concentration is associated with
smaller deviations of actual inflation rates from predicted rates in the aftermath of the 1973-
74 OPEC price shock.
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1. Introduction
This paper contributes to the growing body of empirical evidence suggesting that the
interaction of labour market institutions and the preferences of central bankers have a
significant impact on macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation and unemployment.
Inflation results from coordination failures in wage contracting when rational,  optimizing
unions participating in unsynchronized and decentralized wage bargaining with firms engage
in nominal wage push or leapfrogging to prevent erosion of their relative and real wages. If
this push is accommodated by the monetary authority, then wage and price inflation results. If
it is not, the increase in real wages raises unemployment. Previous papers have shown that
differences in the  organization of worker and employer unions  (such as the degree of
centralization or “corporatism”) explain a considerable part of the diverse inflationary
experiences among otherwise similar economies, even after accounting for differences in the
independence of their central banks. In this paper, we use data on 15 OECD countries (1955-
1990) drawn from the Golden-Wallerstein-Lange (1997) dataset to determine the effect of
various labour market variables on inflation and unemployment. Theoretical models
consistent with our hypothesis that labour market variables are important determinants of
inflation and unemployment are found in  Calmfors and  Driffill (1988),  Bleaney (1996),
Cukierman and Lippi (1999), and Velasco and Guzzo (1999), and will be discussed later.
Our results suggest that inflation  has a hump-shaped relationship with central bank
independence and union density, as well as a negative relationship with union concentration,
while unemployment has a U-shaped relationship with union density, and a hump-shaped
relationship with union concentration and central bank independence. These findings are
largely robust to the use of alternative estimators and assumptions on the structure of the error
term. Further results are obtained from stratifying the sample by central bank independence
and union concentration. These are then compared with the conflicting predictions of two
recent theoretical models to verify their empirical validity. Finally, we estimate the impact of
central bank independence, union density and union concentration on the unexpected jump in
inflation arising from the 1973-4 OPEC oil shock. The counterfactual is generated from the
multi-country version of the FAIRMODEL. In the immediate aftermath of the oil price shock,
greater central bank independence is strongly correlated with smaller deviations of actual
inflation from their predicted values. Two years after the shock, the effects of central bank
independence fade away and are replaced by that of union concentration. These findings are
consistent with our hypothesis that greater union concentration inhibits the wage-price spiral
set off by negative aggregate supply shocks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews previous literature related to our
study while section 3 looks at two competing theoretical models and their contrasting
predictions. Section 4 discusses our data sources and methodology. Section 5 describes our
empirical specifications, and is followed by a presentation of our results in section 6. In
Section 7, we show the corresponding results when unemployment is the dependent variable.
Section 8 investigates how differently union variables impact on inflation and unemployment
in countries with low central bank independence vis-à-vis those with high central bank
independence. Section 9 examines the relationship between union concentration and supply
shocks, while Section 10 concludes.4
2. Related Literature
2.1 Collective Bargaining and Macroeconomic Performance
In a seminal paper,  Calmfors and  Driffill (1988) found the existence of a hump-shaped
relationship between the degree of centralization in wage bargaining and real wages, inflation
and unemployment. The idea is that competitive forces restrain wages, while potential gains
from  internalization of the external effects of wage increases are greater within large
encompassing organizations. Intermediate degrees of  centralization are harmful in the way
that Olson (1982) suggested: organized interests may be most detrimental to social welfare
when they are strong enough to cause significant disruptions but insufficiently encompassing
to bear sufficiently the costs inflicted upon society by their self-interested actions.
More specifically, when wage bargaining is centralized, the parties involved tend to
internalize the impact of their wage push on price inflation and recognize its futility in raising
the real wage. On the other hand, decentralized wage bargaining makes individual firms more
resistant to rising wage demands, as each firm faces an elastic demand curve and competitors
who may not be under the same cost pressure. Intermediate levels of wage bargaining result in
the worst inflation and unemployment performance because neither of these “externality” and
“competition” effects is present to induce wage restraint.
Defining centralization as the extent of inter-union and inter-employer cooperation in
wage bargaining with the other side, Calmfors and Driffill ranked countries based on an index
which takes into account the extent of coordination both within and between various central
organizations. They find that both highly centralized and highly decentralized economies are
likely to perform better (in terms of unemployment, employment, and inflation) than
intermediately  centralized ones.
1 To complement their empirical findings, they simulate a
model where intermediate levels of centralization produce the highest real wage and lowest
employment levels. Further support for the hump-shaped hypothesis may be found in
Dowrick (1993), Freeman (1988), Heitger (1987), and Rowthorn (1992). In addition, other
collective bargaining rankings may be found in Blyth (1979), Schmitter (1981), Lehmbruch
(1984), Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) and Layard et al. (1991).
Papers prior to Calmfors and Driffill tested for the presence of a linear relationship
between a country’s economic performance and its degree of “corporatism”.  [Bruno and
Sachs (1985), Cameron (1984), Couch (1985), and Tarantelli (1986)]
2. For example, Bruno
and  Sachs (1985) examine the relationship between corporatism (defined as the
‘institutionalized negotiation, bargaining,  collabouration, and accord about wages and
‘income policies’ between representatives of the major economic groupings, most typically
labour confederations and employers’ associations’) and macroeconomic outcomes such as
the misery index. Using an index of labour market corporatism (taking in consideration union
movement centralization, shop-floor autonomy, and employer coordination), the authors find
                                                                
1 Subsequent studies have found mixed evidence for this hump-shape hypothesis. For example, Bean (1994),
Grier (1997), Soskice (1990) and OECD (1997) find no evidence for the hypothesis, in contrast to Bleaney
(1996) [discussed later in the text] and Scarpetta (1996).
2  More recent proponents of a linear relationship have based their preference on their belief that the afore-
mentioned “externality” effect (which is larger with more centralized wage bargaining arrangements)
dominates the “competition” effect present in decentralized wage bargaining systems. See Layard et al.
(1991), Soskice (1990) and Traxler et al. (1996), for example.5
that each unit rise in the index is associated, for given GDP performance, with a reduction in
inflation of 1.5 percentage points. The weakness of their approach is that it does not focus
sufficiently strongly on the issue of the proportion of the labour force covered by the typical
wage bargain. It fails to distinguish highly decentralized systems with weak unions (such as
the US) from less decentralized systems with union power diffused to shop floor level (such
as the UK): both earn a score of zero on the corporatism index. Moreover, a maximum score
is consistent both with separate negotiations for each industry (Germany) or for economy-
wide negotiations (Austria). As Bleany (1996) points out, the ability to push up relative wages
in the former case but not the latter makes it crucial to distinguish them.
Appendix B [drawn from OECD (1997)] summarizes the results of recent research on
the impact of collective bargaining structures on macroeconomic performance. For an
authoritative and comprehensive survey on recent attempts to study the link between a
country’s labour market structures and its economic performance,  Flanagan (1999) is an
invaluable resource. In explaining the apparent fragility of many of the results reported in
these studies, Flanagan point to their serious shortcomings such as:
(1)  Failing to distinguish between union density/membership and union coverage, the
percentage of the labour force that is actually covered by collective bargaining
agreements.
(2)  Omitting the role of international trade in muting the institutional impact of union
structures on macroeconomic performance. Clearly, the increased competitive
pressures from greater openness to imports will undermine unions’ influence on the
price setting behavior of firms.
(3)  Ranking countries by their degree of bargaining centralization and then including the
rank of a country as the independent variable representing institutional structure.
Apart from the disputes about the correctness of various ranking criteria, this
procedure also imposes the undesirable assumption that equal differences in ranking
denote equal differences in structure. The focus on a single aggregative measure may
also obscure the exact effect of common institutional features producing the
correlation and suggest an influence on economic outcomes for some elements of the
index that actually have no influence.
Our study may thus be seen as a concerted attempt to address many of these important
issues and concerns.
2.2 Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance
The framework that has guided the other strand of related literature on monetary
institutions and inflation consists of time consistency models of inflation, especially Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and  Barro and Gordon (1983). In these models, the lack of credible
commitment devices leads central banks to choose higher than optimal rates of inflation, even
though they share the private sector’s preferences for inflation relative to output. These
models suggest that institutional features of a central bank (such as the length of  it’s
governor’s term of appointment) may significantly affect inflation outcomes. In addition,
Rogoff (1985) has argued that governments have an incentive to appoint ‘conservative’
central banks (that is, those who have an anti-inflation reputation) so as to raise their anti-
inflation credibility. The degree of influence of the central bank on monetary policy (its
‘independence’) should therefore be reflected in the country’s inflation figures.6
Several authors have examined the relationship between average inflation and proxies
for central bank independence (CBI for short, and sometimes also referred to as ‘central bank
conservatism’
3).  Grilli,  Masciandaro, and  Tabellini (1991), for example, construct one
indicator of political independence and another of economic independence of central banks
for a sample of high-income countries. They  regress cross-country differences in inflation
rates on both indicators and a dummy variable for participation in the European Monetary
System (EMS). The indicators of CBI have what is seen to be the expected negative sign,
while the estimated coefficient on the EMS dummy is not significantly different from zero.
Alesina and Summers (1993) generate a comparable result using similar indices and samples.
Cukierman, Webb, and  Neyapti (1992), also document a negative relationship between
inflation and CBI for high-income countries, but they show that the relation exhibits the
wrong sign for low- and middle-income countries. When  Posen (1993, 1995) inserts a
variable called ‘financial opposition to inflation’ that is designed to measure the financial
sector’s distaste for inflation and its ability to express that distaste, the commonly presumed
ability of CBI to lower inflation, independent of the central bank’s political context, is refuted.
Other factors which some researchers believe are important to the inflation story include the
openness of economies (see, for example,  Romer (1993)) and optimal tax considerations
(Mankiw (1997); Poterba and Rotemberg (1990), among others). A summary of the results
from these works may be found in Campillo and  Miron (1997). These authors proceed to
show that when the openness, size, political stability, exchange rate regime, per-capita debt,
and per-capita incomes of countries are taken into account, central bank independence has no
significant independent effect on inflation. For these reasons, we restrict our study to 15
advanced economies that differ primarily in the conservatism of their central banks and their
labour market structures.
One of the first attempts to synthesize the two strands of research is Bleaney (1996).
He presents a simple model which encompasses both hypotheses and tests the model on data
for 17 OECD countries. In this model, the inflationary bias is imparted by the fact that the
unemployment rate necessary to curb upward pressure on real wages is higher than that
represented by the government’s ‘bliss point’. The authorities’ willingness to accommodate
this inflationary pressure depends on the independence of the central bank. The institutional
structure of the labour market influences the outcome by affecting the trade-off between real
wages and employment faced by the unions. One significant feature of the model is that
countries with less  favorable wage bargaining structures have more to gain from greater
independence of their central bank.  Bleaney finds that central bank independence has a
significant effect on CPI inflation while the labour market variables (the Bruno-Sachs
corporatism index, the Calmfors-Driffill centralization ranking, and a composite index of the
two) are mostly insignificant. With regard to unemployment,  Bleaney finds that greater
centralization and stronger corporatism exert a salubrious influence.
3. Two Theoretical Models and Their Predictions
                                                                
3 Strictly speaking, central bank independence and central bank conservatism are only interchangeable if we
believe that a more independent central bank has a stronger distaste for inflation. Of course, we can find
instances where a central bank is legally and politically highly independent but chooses to view
unemployment as being a greater evil than inflation.7
Two recent papers attempt far more sophisticated modelling of the interaction between labour
unions and a monetary authority in the framework of a non-cooperative game. Interestingly,
they produce contrasting predictions for the role of  centralization and central bank
independence in explaining inflation and unemployment. Our results can therefore be used to
discriminate between the efficacy of the two models.
3.1  Cukierman and Lippi (1999)
In Cukierman and Lippi (1999), the labour market is characterized by the degree of
centralization of bargaining and by the degree of trade unions’ inflation aversion. The latter
leads each union to moderate its wage demands in order to induce the central bank to inflate at
a lower rate. As in the Calmfors and Driffill paper, increasing centralization produces two
opposing effects on real wages and inflation: the decrease in the number of unions reduces the
substitutability between the labours of different unions and the degree of effective
competition between them (the “competition effect”) while strengthening the moderating
effect of inflationary fears on the real wage demands of each union (the “strategic effect”).
The interaction between these two effects determines the shape and position of the relation
between centralization, real wages, inflation and unemployment.
In their model, each union sets its nominal wage taking the nominal wages of other
unions and the reaction function of the central bank as given. The central bank then chooses
monetary policy and inflation. This game between unions and the central bank is solved by
backward induction: the authors first derive the choice of inflation by the central bank, and
then the choice of wage rates by unions.
The typical union seeks high wages and low unemployment for its members, and also
dislikes inflation. Its loss function is given by
22 2 jrjj wAuB p W”-++   (1)
where  j u  is the rate of unemployment among members of union j,  1 pp p - =-  is the rate of
inflation (equal to the difference in the log of the price level) and  A and  B are positive
parameters.
The demand for the labour of workers in union j is given by









j L  is demand for the labour of that union,  rj w  is the log of the real wage obtained by
its members,  r w  is the average real wage over all unions, while a, ?, d and n are positive
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which is independent of the number of unions.
The central bank is concerned with aggregate unemployment u and price stability,
choosing inflation to minimize the loss function
22 uI p G”+   (4)
(where I is a measure of the relative inflation aversion of the central bank), subject to the
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where  w is the average nominal wage,  1 p-  is the log of the previous period price level and
1/
c













rr ww f ”-   (6)
Since f  represents the excess of the average equilibrium real wage over the competitive real
wage, it is referred to as the real wage premium. Imposing the rational expectations condition
E pp =  in the absence of uncertainty, the equilibrium expression for inflation is
I
a
pf = .   (7)
Each union thus chooses the nominal wage  j w  so as to  minimize its loss function,
taking the nominal wages of other unions and the central bank’s reaction function of monetary
policy to nominal wages as given. The solution to the union’s optimization problem yields the
real wage premium
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The equilibrium unemployment rate is equal to u af = .
Predictions:
1.  For a finite number of unions, the more unions care about price stability (the higher is B)
and/or the higher is substitutability between different types of labour (the higher is g ), the
lower is the equilibrium real wage premium and the lower are inflation and
unemployment.
2.  Both unemployment and inflation are lower in a fully decentralized labour market than in
a fully centralized one, as long as the weight attached to inflation by the central bank is
non-zero.
3.  Unemployment and inflation are positively related to the degree of  centralization of
unions (1/n) when unions do not care much about price stability (low values of B), while
the relationship is a hump-shaped one for sufficiently high degrees of inflation aversion.
4.  An increase in the degree of central bank independence raises the rate of unemployment if
unions are averse to inflation (B > 0) and/or there are at least two unions and some degree
of substitutability in the demands for their labour ( 0 g >  and  1 n > ).
5.  The sign of the partial derivative with respect to inflation with respect to the inflation
aversion of the central bank (B) is negative for sufficiently large number of unions n, but
may be positive for given values of n if B is sufficiently large.
Broadly stated, ( i) a rise in CBI is associated with lower inflation and higher
unemployment
4; (ii) there is a hump-shaped relationship between centralization and inflation
                                                                
4 Hall and Franzese (1996) also find that in economies with highly centralized labor markets, greater central
bank independence increases unemployment.9
for countries with low CBI and a positive monotonic relationship for countries with high CBI;
and (iii) the effect of CBI on unemployment is stronger at high levels than low levels of
centralization, while the (absolute) effect of CBI on inflation is hump-shaped with respect to
centralization.
Cukierman and Lippi then use pooled cross-section and time-series data (for the years
1980, 1990 and 1994) from 19 developed economies to undertake a preliminary evaluation of
their model’s theoretical implications. Their empirical results provide support for some of the
implications. For example, at low levels of CBI, they identify a clear hump-shaped
relationship between inflation (as well as unemployment) and centralization
5; this relation
vanishes at high levels of CBI. In addition, they show that the inflation-reducing impact of
CBI is largest when centralization of wage bargaining is at intermediate levels, and that there
is a significant and positive effect of CBI on unemployment at low levels of centralization.
Their findings are summarized in Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C.
3.2  Velasco and Guzzo (1999)
Velasco and Guzzo (1999) present a general equilibrium, optimizing model to study
the joint effects of centralization in wage setting and central bank independence. Their model
dispenses with the somewhat ad-hoc assumption made in Cukierman and Lippi (1999) that the
elasticity of substitution of labour supplied by different unions is always increasing in the
number of unions and goes to infinity as the number of unions goes to infinity. Rather, the
model is built completely on microeconomic foundations, using the firm’s production
function as the starting point. They obtain very different implications for the number of
unions on the elasticity of substitution between various types of labour.
In this model, the economy consists of a single representative firm that produces a single
consumption good, and a continuum of symmetric workers (indexed by i and arranged in the
unit interval) who supply labour, receive dividends from the firm, and consume. Workers are
organized in  2 n ‡  unions (indexed by j), each of which has a set of members of measure 
1 n
-
on whose behalf it sets wages. There exists a government, which sets the rate of inflation and
thus affects real wages. The timing of moves is as follows: Unions move first, setting the rate
of nominal wage growth  i w  for each worker i in each union j. The government moves next,
setting the rate of price increase p . Finally, the firm sets employment and output by moving
along its labour demand curve.
The representative firm maximizes profits
1
0 ii DYWLdi =- ￿   (9)
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5 Centralization is defined as the predominant level at which wage negotiations occur. Cukierman and Lippi
assume that as wage bargaining becomes more centralized, the number of negotiating units which bargain in
an uncoordinated manner increases. This, they argue, correspond to an increase in n in the theoretical model,
and hence, centralization can be interpreted as a proxy for 1/n.10
where  Y is the representative firm’s output and  i L  is labour input from worker  i. The
parameter s  is the elasticity of substitution among the different types of labour supplied by
workers, and a  is a returns to scale parameter.
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where  i C  is consumption by worker i, and  g  and  p b  are preference parameters, and each
worker faces the budget constraint
iiii CWLD =+ . (12)
Each union j represents the workers that lie contiguously in the interval 
1 (,) jnj
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which it maximizes by setting the rate of price inflation every period.
6 In doing so, it affects
the level of the aggregate real wage, whose time path is given by
( ) ( ) 1/1 W wp =++ (16)
where p  and w  are again the percent increases in the price level and the nominal wage.












Taking this into account, the representative union solves its  maximization problem and
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Combining the rules of government and union yields the equilibrium level of employment for




























                                                                
6 The worker’s and government’s objective functions differ by the degree of aversion to inflation,  p b  and  g b .11
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Predictions:
1.  For a fixed number n of unions, a radical-populist central banker, who cares not at all
about the costs of inflation, maximizes the welfare of the population by delivering zero
inflation and optimal employment and output levels.
2.  For a fixed number n of unions, employment and output fall as the central bank becomes
more conservative (independent).
3.  For a fixed number n of unions, inflation is hump-shaped in the degree of central bank
independence, and a moderate central banker (one that is neither strongly conservative nor
strongly populist) maximizes the rate of inflation.
4.  For a given level of central bank independence,
(a) If the elasticity of substitution among different types of labour is sufficiently small,
then economic performance (inflation and unemployment) and welfare are uniformly
decreasing in the number of unions.
(b) Otherwise, economic performance and welfare are hump-shaped in the number of
unions (and thus U-shaped with respect to centralization), and there is an intermediate
degree of centralization that maximizes economic performance and welfare.
The two models therefore make very different predictions with regard to the impact of
centralization of wage bargaining on inflation and unemployment. Cukierman and  Lippi’s
model predicts a positive or hump-shaped relationship between inflation/unemployment and
centralization depending on the central bank’s aversion to inflation, while  Velasco and
Guzzo’s model predicts that economic performance is either increasing or U-shaped in the
degree of centralization.
In this paper, we re-examine the empirical relationships between the structure of the
labour market, monetary institutions, inflation and unemployment in light of these recent
theoretical developments. The conflicting predictions and therefore the validity of the
theoretical models will be tested by the careful examination of available data. A summary of
these comparisons is given in Appendix C. Compared to previous empirical studies on the
joint effect of labour market and monetary institutions on macroeconomic performance, our
primary innovations are: the replacement of corporatism or  centralization ratings/rankings
with an index of union concentration, the use of panel data that this time-varying index makes
possible, the deployment of more sophisticated econometric techniques, stratification of the
panel by central bank independence and union concentration, and the inclusion of important
controls such as trade openness and the generosity of unemployment benefits. Panel data from
15 OECD countries is used to test our hypothesis that labour market variables are important in
explaining price inflation and unemployment, even after controlling for differences in the
degree of central bank independence. In contrast to previous studies where the average rate of
inflation over some time period (for example, a decade) is regressed on CBI and wage setting12
variables, we regress annual inflation rates on these variables. Doing so enables us to take
into account country-specific observable characteristics, as well as unobservable ones such as
tastes and preferences for inflation and unemployment. To deal with the econometric
complications that arise from using time series in addition to cross section data, we employ
additional estimators (with different assumptions on the structure of the error term) to test the
robustness of our results.
4. Data Sources and Methodology
4.1  Data sources
4.1.1 Central Bank Independence
The measure of central bank independence used in our regressions is the overall decade-
average measure by  Cukierman, Webb and  Neyapti (1992).  This is an index of legal
independence based on 16 different criteria covering the following areas: the terms of office,
appointment and dismissal of the central bank governor; determination of monetary policy;
the objectives of the central bank; and the limitations on the ability of the central bank to lend
to the government. An alternative index using eight criteria for political independence and
seven for economic independence of central banks constructed by  Grilli, Masciandaro, and
Tabellini (1991) is available but was not used. The chief drawback of these indices is that CBI
is assumed to be time-invariant, when in fact regime shifts are plausible and indeed do occur,
albeit infrequently.
4.1.2 Union Variables
The figures for union density, union coverage and union concentration are drawn from the
comprehensive data set on union structures compiled by political scientists Golden,
Wallerstein and Lange (1998) [henceforth called the GWL dataset]. Additional data on other
labour market variables such as unemployment benefits are taken from Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991), and Nickell and  Layard (1999). Inflation and unemployment figures are
provided by the OECD.
Although the GWL data set covers the years 1950 to 1992 for 16 OECD countries
7,
there are many missing union concentration data values for Belgium throughout this period
and for the years 1950-1954, 1991 and 1992 for most countries. Several other countries also
have substantial missing data points between 1955 and 1970. Consequently, we have
restricted our data set to 15 countries spanning the years 1971 to 1990. Union coverage data is
only available for the years 1980 and 1990 in 12 countries, only the year 1990 in 3 countries,
and unavailable in Italy for either of those two years. In addition, many of the other
institutional variables pertaining to unemployment benefits and the tax wedge are only
available for a single year, almost always in the mid-1980s. In summary, time-series data are
only available for union density and union concentration, while all other explanatory variables
                                                                
7 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA.13
(including mean union coverage, obtained by averaging the two time observations per
country, when available) are time invariant.
4.2  Methodology
We regress the annual inflation and unemployment rates on central bank independence, union
density, union coverage, union concentration and the wage bargaining level. In the inflation
regressions we also control for the degree of trade openness, as the union span of control in
product markets decreases in more open economies as imports exert competitive pressures on
domestic producers. In the unemployment regressions, we include other institutional features
that have been shown to be important determinants of unemployment in earlier studies. These
include the total tax wedge, employment protection (as proxy for the extent to which unions
take into account wage effects on employment), active labour market program expenditure (as
proxy for worker search effectiveness), and replacement rate and benefit duration variables
(as proxies for the effects of unemployment benefits). Although one may argue that variables
controlling for the macroeconomic effects such as the output gap or changes in inflation and
unemployment should also be included, we believe that these variables tend to be highly
endogenous and may potentially bias the estimates on  all the explanatory variables. The
inclusion of controls for year effects in one of our regression specifications takes care of
demand and supply shocks common to all the OECD countries in our sample. Moreover, the
degree of independence of a country’s central bank should also act as a proxy for the
macroeconomic policies pursued in that country (with their resultant impact on aggregate
demand).
In our regressions, we include both union density and union coverage as each variable
captures a different aspect of union bargaining strength and scope of influence. Union density
by itself is an inadequate measure of union scope, as even in countries where legal extension
of collective bargaining coverage does not exist, some non-union employers may adopt
wages, benefits and other features of union contracts in an effort to thwart  unionization of
their workforce.
Our measure of union concentration in each country is a  Herfindahl index of the












where i denotes a country and t denotes a year. mijt is the membership figure for the jth union
confederation in country i in year t, while mit is the total union membership for country  i in
year t. The index attains its maximum value when there is one union confederation accounting
for the entire union membership in a country. For a given number of union confederations, the
index is smallest when these confederations are of identical size.
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Łł ￿ where  it L is the total labor force for country i in year t and every non-unionized worker is
treated as an independent union with a membership of one. However, we believe that union density and
union concentration exert independent effects on our nominal and real variables of interest, and that it is
important to distinguish between these effects.14
The theoretical motivation for using this Herfindahl index of union concentration is
our belief that nominal wage push is generated by unions who do not internalize the costs that
their demands for higher nominal wages impose on the economy. The lack of coordination
and the resulting wage inflation (which feeds into price inflation if firms practice mark-up
pricing) are expected to be more severe in countries where union confederations are
numerous, weak and fragmented.  Although wage bargaining in some countries may take
place at the industry or firm level rather than at the national level, industry-level and firm-
level unions operate largely under the direction of their national union confederations, which
set wage norms and determine the affiliated unions’ posture at the bargaining table.
Conceptually, our measure of union concentration is similar to the  Calmfors and
Driffill’s centralization rankings and Bruno-Sachs’ corporatism index. Bruno and Sachs use
an index of ‘corporatism’ which arranges countries on a scale of 0 to 4. The corporatism index
is made up of a subjective one/zero categorization along four dimensions: national rather than
plant-level wage negotiations, power of trade unions  vis-à-vis their members; degree of
employer organization; and weakness of shopfloor union representatives.
Calmfors and  Driffill (1988) argue that both highly  centralized and highly
decentralized wage-bargaining systems are better than moderately centralized systems, which
tend to create an incentive for leapfrogging  behavior between well-organized bargaining
groups. Translating the concept of  centralization into a number for each country is
complicated, however. The authors offer only a ranking of countries by degree of
centralization based on subjective judgement on the levels of coordination within national
union confederations and national employer organizations, as well as the number of existing
central union confederations (and employer federations) and the extent of their cooperation.
The primary advantage of using union concentration as a proxy for the degree of union
coordination in wage setting has over alternatives like the Calmfors-Driffill and Bruno-Sachs
measures is that it is objective, being mathematically computed from raw data on union
confederation membership. Moreover, union confederation membership figures fluctuate
from one year to another, and new union confederations are occasionally created while some
others are dissolved, thereby making the use of panel data possible. A comparison between
the three measures from an earlier study of 10 OECD countries (1971-85) by Chou (1999) is
shown in Table 1
9. The drawback to the union concentration measure, however, is that it does
not take into consideration the actual level (plant, industry, or national) where wage
bargaining takes place, and may be missing qualitative information captured by the other
indices. For example, our measure has particular difficulties with the UK. The UK appears to
have high union concentration since there is only one national union confederation (the Trade
Union Congress), although in reality the wage negotiations take place at the plant level, and
are largely informal, fragmented, and autonomous. Wage push is thus a significant problem in
the UK, although it would not appear to be so just by looking at its degree of union
concentration. This problem is addressed by including an index of the level at which wage
bargaining takes place in each country. This index takes an account the fact that bargaining
may take place at multiple levels in a single country.  For example, lower levels of bargaining
may emerge not only to implement the wage provisions of an agreement reached at a higher
level, but also address industry or firm-level issues on which the central agreement is silent.
                                                                
9 The correlation coefficient between our Herfindahl index of union concentration and the Bruno-Sachs
corporatism index is 0.227 (or 0.462 with the UK excluded); the correlation coefficient between the union
concentration measure and the Calmfors-Driffill centralization ranking is 0.463 (0.634, UK excluded).15
5.   Model Specifications
5.1  Predicted Results
In accordance with the theoretical discussions above, our basic empirical specification for the
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where CBI stands for central bank independence, UDENS for union density,  UDEN2  for
union density squared, UCOV for union coverage, UCONC for the Herfindahl index of union
concentration, UCONC2 for union concentration squared, BARGLEV for the level of wage
bargaining and OPENNESS for the imports-GDP ratio.
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where  LABMKTVAR is a vector of institutional variables including the total tax wedge
(TOTAXWED), employment protection ( EMPROTCT), unemployment benefits replacement
rate ( BENRR), benefit duration (BENDUR), and active labour market program expenditure
(ALMP).
Conventional wisdom holds that greater central bank independence will result in lower
inflation and higher unemployment. The assumption is that central bankers are relatively more
averse to inflation than are governments, who greatly dislike unemployment because it
reduces their prospects of re-election. However, the theoretical model of Velasco and Guzzo
(1999) predicts that, for a fixed number of unions (that is, controlling for the extent of
centralization in wage bargaining), inflation is hump-shaped with respect to the degree of
central bank independence. The relationship between inflation and CBI only becomes
monotonic in the special case where the number of unions approaches infinity. More
conventionally, Velasco and Guzzo’s model also predicts that employment and output fall as
the central bank becomes more conservative/independent.
Holding the number of unions constant, union density should also exhibit a hump-
shaped relationship with inflation. When union density/membership is high, the demand for
unionized labour becomes less elastic, inducing greater wage pressures from unions. On the
other hand, the effect of an increase of nominal union wages on the general price level (and
therefore real union wages) is also stronger when union density is high, which will counteract
the first effect. Similarly, when union density is low, demand for unionized labour becomes
highly elastic while the effect of rising nominal union wages on the general price level is low.
Like the  Calmfors-Driffill argument for  centralization of wage bargaining, it is the
intermediate case (where union density is neither very high nor very low) where the
counterbalancing of the two opposing effects are absent and therefore the macroeconomic
outcomes worst. Inflation and unemployment are thus predicted to be highest in countries
with intermediate union densities.16
Theoretically, the impact of union coverage (the percentage of the labour force that is
covered by collective wage bargaining agreements) on inflation and unemployment is unclear.
If a country has relatively high union density, then greater union coverage has a similar effect
to an increase in union density, which will reduce inflation and unemployment. However, if
union density is relatively low, greater union coverage will cause the unions to behave like
those in a country with an intermediate degree of  unionization, worsening macroeconomic
performance.
As explained previously, the recent theoretical models of Cukierman and Lippi (1999)
and Velasco and Guzzo (1999) make very different predictions for the impact of the number
of unions (proxied empirically by “ centralization”, the predominant level at which wage
negotiations take place
10) on inflation and unemployment. Our  Herfindahl index of union
concentration is related to the number of unions in the following way: holding the relative size
of union confederations constant, an increase in their number lowers the value of the index.
The estimated coefficients for union concentration and union concentration squared can
therefore be used to discriminate between the empirical validity of the two competing
theoretical models.
We can also study the interaction between union concentration and union density in
determining the inflation rate. If unions are heavily concentrated (the extreme case being the
existence of only one union confederation), there arises a hump-shaped relationship between
union density and inflation. When union density is high so that the size of each identical union
confederation is large, all union confederations realize the futility of nominal wage push in
raising real wages: their wage push will simply result in higher production costs and product
prices. When union density is low, the elasticity of demand for unionized labour is high, so
nominal wage push by a union will likely result in layoffs of unionized workers. When union
density is in the intermediate range, neither of these salutary effects is present, leading to
higher inflation in such an economy.
On the other hand, when union concentration is low, we should see a positive
relationship between union density and inflation. The reason is as follows: suppose now that
there are many union confederations of equally small size. When union density is low, each
union confederation knows that demand for its labour is highly elastic and so refrains from
wage push. When union density is high, it fails to internalize fully the cost of its wage push
since its members contribute to only a fraction of total labour costs in the economy. The
incidence of wage push in countries with low union concentration thus becomes more likely
when union density falls. In the parlance of  Cukierman and  Lippi (1999), the “strategic
effect” is weak when union concentration is low.
We can test whether this line of reasoning fits the observed data by dividing our
sample of 15 countries into three equal-sized groups according to the average union
concentration measure for each country. We then jointly estimate the relationship between the
inflation, central bank independence and union density for the three groups. In addition, we
can test the restriction that central bank independence has an identical effect on all groups of
countries.
The relationship between the level of wage bargaining and inflation is expected to be a
hump-shaped one. Holding all other conditions constant, countries in which bargaining takes
                                                                
10 Cukierman and Lippi argue that as wage bargaining becomes more decentralized, the number of
negotiating units which bargain in an uncoordinated manner increases. This corresponds to an increase on n
in the theoretical model and hence, centralization can be interpreted as a proxy for 1/n.17
place primarily at the intermediate (industry) level will suffer higher inflation than those with
decentralized or highly  centralized wage bargaining systems. When wage bargaining is
completely  decentralized unions have comparatively little monopoly power, while unions
involved in highly centralized wage bargains are concerned about the impact of their nominal
wage push on the general price level and real wages. Just as in the argument made previously
regarding union density, unions are up to the most mischief when neither the “monopoly” nor
“real-wage” effects are present to restrain their wage push. This undesirable situation arises in
countries with intermediate levels of wage bargaining.
The openness of a country is predicted to reduce inflation by making product markets
more competitive and reducing the ability of firms to pass on wage increases to consumers.
The total tax wedge (the gap between the real cost of labour per worker and the consumption
wage)  is expected to be positively correlated with the unemployment rate. The impact of
employment protection legislation on inflation is, however, ambiguous. On the one hand, they
may reduce arbitrary dismissals, lower contracting costs by setting general rules and
standards, as well as encouraging on-the-job training and human capital formation. On the
other hand, firms may become more cautious in hiring workers if they feel that these
regulations oblige them to retain workers who are no longer needed. [Scarpetta (1996)]. By
reducing incentives for the unemployed to engage in serious job search, unemployment
benefit duration and the replacement rate (the ratio of benefits to the last earned wage) should
both be positively correlated with the unemployment rate. A more generous benefit duration
also increases the size of the long-term unemployed pool. Expenditure on active labour
market programs (a proxy for worker search effectiveness)  is predicted to be negatively
correlated with the unemployment rate.
5.2  Econometric Issues
In using panel data, we are able to explore how cross-country differences and time series
variations in central bank independence and union variables affect inflation and
unemployment. To investigate how pure cross-country differences impact inflation, we can
regress the average inflation (and unemployment) rate for each country on their CBI index,
their average union density, union coverage and concentration values, as well as their wage





















where  INFLATION i is the average inflation rate for country i, UDENSi is the average union
density for country i, and UCONCi is the average union concentration for that country.
In addition, panel data allows us to remove time-invariant country-specific effects by
using a fixed effects estimator. These idiosyncratic, country-specific effects encompass both
observed variables such as central bank independence and unobservables such as tastes and


















where the  di’s are country dummies. The estimated parameters indicate how much time
variations in union density and concentration explains the evolution of inflation in each
country. Since our measure of CBI is fixed for each country, it is subsumed in the country
fixed effect.
The loss of degrees of freedom arising from using fixed effects estimation can be
avoided if we assume that the country-specific effects are random. The random effects model
(implemented by using generalized least squares) is an appropriate specification if we are
drawing the countries in our sample randomly from a larger population (such as all the OECD
countries). In the two-way error component regression model, we also allow for a time (year)
effect to absorb shocks that impact all countries in the sample in a given year. This in some
sense accounts for part of the autocorrelation we observe in the inflation data as well as the
impact of demand and supply shocks on inflation (and unemployment), since in our sample
period all the countries were concurrently affected by the two OPEC shocks. The random





















The validity of the random effects model hinges on the independence of the individual
invariant effects from the other dependent variables and the i.i.d. disturbance term. When the
independence criteria is satisfied, the GLS estimator is BLUE, consistent and asymptotically
efficient, but is otherwise biased and inconsistent. On the other hand, the “within” (fixed
effects) estimator is consistent whether or not the independence criteria is satisfied. Based on
these differences, the  Hausman test may be used to discriminate between these two
specifications.
Finally, we consider a first-order autoregressive model in which the random errors are
allowed to be contemporaneously correlated,  heteroscedastic, and first-order autoregressive
( ititit uu re =+  where  e  is the pure white-noise component). This model is particularly
appropriate since the inflation time-series often exhibits a high degree of  autocorrelation.
Details on the various estimators used are provided in Appendix D.
6. Empirical Results
6.1  Sample Statistics
The sample statistics for the 15 OECD countries is shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows
the mean, standard deviation,  minimum and maximum values for the dependent and
explanatory variables used in our regressions. Table 3 table shows the average union density,
union coverage and union concentration values for each country. A summary of wage
bargaining systems in OECD countries by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) is reproduced
in Appendix A.  Plots of union density and union concentration versus inflation and
unemployment are shown in Fig. 1.
From Table 2, we see that the mean inflation and unemployment rates for the 15
OECD countries in our sample from 1971 to 1990 were 7.26% and 4.99% respectively. The
standard deviations for both variables were large at 4.33 and 3.18 respectively. Pronounced
cross-country differences in their inflation and unemployment experiences are also apparent.19
For example, inflation and unemployment in Switzerland averaged 4.6% and 0.4%
respectively between 1971 and 1990. In the same period, Italy’s mean inflation and
unemployment rates were 12.6% and 8.4%.  As is well known, the plots in Fig. 1 show that
inflation in most countries rose sharply (spiked) during the two oil price shocks in the 1970s
but declined throughout the 1980s, while unemployment rose steadily after the shocks and
decreased somewhat only from the mid- to late-eighties. Tables 2 and 3 also show that labour
market institutions and policies differed sharply across the 15 countries. Union density ranged
(across time and between countries) from 0.085 to 0.846 with a mean of 0.419, union
coverage from 0.22 to 0.95 (mean = 0.655), union concentration from 0.25 to 1 (mean =
0.653), the unemployment benefit replacement ratio from 20% to 90%, and benefit duration
from 0.5 to 4 years. Even the total tax wedge varied between countries from 28.7% to 70.7%,
while the openness to imports measure varied between 0.07 (USA) to 0.48 (Netherlands)
11.
Finally, the degree of central bank independence ranged from 0.17 (Norway) to Germany
(0.69).
6.1 Aggregate Data (OLS Estimation)
Table 4 presents the results of the inflation regressions using Ordinary Least Squares. The
first column shows the estimates from  a regression with CBI, union coverage, union
concentration, level of wage bargaining and openness to trade as the explanatory variables.
Only union coverage has a significant positive correlation with the rate of inflation, while
trade openness has a significant negative correlation. When union coverage is replaced by
union density (columns 2 and 3), union concentration is shown to exhibit a U-shaped
relationship with inflation, while union density exhibits a hump-shaped relationship with
inflation. Allowing for a non-linear relationship between inflation and the bargaining level
index improves the fit of the regression, raising the adjusted  R
2 from 0.2307 to 0.2385
(compare column 2 against column 3). The fit improves considerably when both union
density and union coverage are included in the regression (column 4), and improves further
when we allow for a non-linear relationship between central bank independence and inflation.
The following relationships are robust to the various changes in specification: (1) Union
density has a hump-shaped relationship with inflation; (2) greater union coverage raises
inflation; (3) union concentration exhibits an mild U-shaped (almost purely negative)
relationship with inflation; and (4) greater openness to trade reduces inflation. (Fig. 2 shows
the plots of these relationships, using the mean values of all other variables.) On the other
hand, the convex relationship between inflation and wage bargaining level index (which
violates the prediction made in Section 5.1) vacillates between statistical significance at the
5% level (column 4) and significance at the 10% level or worse (columns 3 and 5). Allowing
for a non-linear relationship between CBI and inflation raises the adjusted R
2 from 0.2648 to
0.3071, making column 5 the most preferred specification. The relationship between CBI and
inflation should therefore be characterized as a hump-shaped one rather than the downward-
sloping one which emerges when the relationship is constrained to be linear.
6.2 Robustness Checks with Alternative Estimators
                                                                
11 Recall that data for the total tax wedge and openness measure were taken in the mid-1980s.20
With the preferred OLS specification from column 5 of Table 4, we now test the robustness of
those results to the use of alternative estimators. Column 1 in Table 5 shows the results of the
“between regression” where the intertemporal dimension has been eliminated to produce a
pure cross-country regression. Each data point comprises the mean values of all explanatory
variables for each country in the sample. The results are surprisingly strong, considering the
fact that there are only 15 observations in the regression. Central bank independence still
exhibits a hump-shaped relationship with inflation (with the t-values at 1.98 and –2.47 for the
squared term), union coverage again has a positive correlation with inflation (t-statistic =
2.47), while trade openness shows a negative correlation with inflation (t-statistic = -1.29).
Perhaps not surprisingly, the time-varying variables, union density and union concentration,
now become statistically insignificant. When we examine the results from the fixed effects
estimation (the “within” regression) shown in column 3 of the same table, the robustness of
the results for the union density and union concentration variables from the OLS regression
are confirmed. The t-statistics for these variables and their squared counterparts range in
absolute value from 4.30 to 7.65.
  Columns 4 and 5 in Table 5 show the results from the 2-way random effects (or
variance components) model implemented using the Fuller-Battase (1974) method, and from
an  autoregressive model implemented using the Parks method. The random effects model
allowing for unobservable country and time effects is preferable to the fixed effects model if
the sample countries is believed to be drawn from a large population. The fixed effects model
it valid only when the differences between units can be viewed as parametric shifts of the
regression function. Since our sample of 15 countries forms a majority of all OECD countries,
we may suspect that the fixed effects approach is superior to the random effects approach. As
explained previously, a major consideration is that the error component (random effects)
regression model requires the unobserved individual invariant effects contained in the error
term be  uncorrelated with the explanatory variables so that  (/)0 itit EuX= . When this
condition is satisfied, the random effects estimator is BLUE, consistent and asymptotically
efficient. When it is not, this estimator is inconsistent. By contrast, the fixed effects estimator
is consistent regardless whether the condition is met nor not, since the within transformation
wipes out the unobserved individual effects. The  Hausman (1978) test allows us to
discriminate between the two specifications. In our case, the Hausman test statistic of 67.76
(with a p-value of less than 0.0001) clearly rejects the validity of the random effects model. It
is thus  unsurprising to note that the model performs poorly with an adjusted  R
2 of only
0.0947. A glance at column 4 reveals that only the bargaining level variables are strongly
correlated with inflation in this regression.
The results from the  autoregressive model (shown in column 5) are much more
reassuring. Even when the autoregressive nature of inflation is accounted for, CBI and union
density continue to exhibit a hump-shaped relationship with inflation, while union
concentration again shows a mild convex relationship with inflation. Only the union coverage
and bargaining level variables lose some statistical significance when compared with the
corresponding OLS regression.
We can now compare our findings against the predictions of the Cukierman-Lippi and
Velasco-Guzzo theoretical models. The hump-shaped relationship observed between inflation
and central bank independence agrees with the prediction of the Velasco-Guzzo model. The
Cukierman-Lippi model predicts that CBI has two opposing effects on the rate of inflation.
For a given wage premium, an increase in CBI reduces equilibrium inflation as in Rogoff21
(1985), but an increase in CBI also raises the wage premium, which tends to increase the rate
of inflation. The net effect of an increase in CBI on inflation is therefore ambiguous in their
model.
The downward-sloping and mildly convex relationship we observed between inflation
and the union concentration is clearly inconsistent with the Cukierman-Lippi  model which
predicts an  upward-sloping or hump-shaped relationship
12 depending on the degree of
inflation aversion among unions. Our results in this respect are, however, consistent with the
Velasco-Guzzo model, which predicts that inflation is monotonically increasing in the number
of unions (n) if the substitutability among different types of labour is limited (see the left-hand
panels in Fig.2 and upper panel in Fig.3).
Moreover, even if Cukierman and Lippi argue in their empirical work that the wage
bargaining level (or “ centralization” in their parlance) is a better proxy for 1/n, our results
here also reject their theoretical model in favor of Velasco and Guzzo’s. We find a negative
relationship between inflation and the wage bargaining level rather than a hump-shaped one.
6.3 High-Union Concentration versus Low-Union Concentration Countries
In this section, we investigate whether the relationships between inflation, central bank
independence and labour market institutions are similar in countries where union
confederations are concentrated when compared with those with fragmented union
confederations.
We divide the sample of 15 countries into three groups of five according to their index
of union concentration. The first group comprises Australia, Austria, the UK, USA and
Canada with an average Herfindahl index of 0.947. The second group consists of most of the
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) as well as Germany and the
Netherlands, with an average union concentration index of 0.606. The last group, made up of
Finland, France, Italy, Japan and Switzerland, have an average concentration index of 0.411.
(See Table 7.) It is interesting to note that the countries in the middle group have, on average,
relatively high union density (0.519 against 0.380 and 0.357 for the other two groups) and
bargaining level (3.1 against 1.9 and 2.4), and relatively low inflation (6.65% against 7.46%
and 7.55%) and unemployment (4.59% against 5.98% and 7.75%).
Table 8 reports the results from a joint estimation of the effects of CBI and union
variables on inflation in all three groups. This is implemented in both OLS and GLS (using
the Parks  autoregressive model) by interacting dummies for the three groups with all
explanatory variables except union concentration. The results may be summarized as follows:
(1) Central bank independence exhibits a hump-shaped relationship with inflation for
countries with high and low degrees of union concentration but a primarily downward-
sloping relationship for countries with intermediate degrees of union concentration.
(2) Union density and unemployment have a positive and convex relationship for countries
with high union concentration; the relationship is a hump-shaped one for countries in the
other two groups. This result is the  exact reverse of our earlier prediction that the
relationship between union density and unemployment is hump-shaped when union
concentration is high and positive when union concentration is low.
                                                                
12 More precisely, the Cukierman-Lippi model predicts an upward-sloping or hump-shaped relationship
between inflation and the inverse of the number of unions (i.e. 1/n). We showed earlier that an increase in n,
ceteris paribus, also reduces the Herfindahl index of union concentration.22
(3) The level of bargaining and inflation have a hump-shaped relationship for countries with
high union concentration (a là Calmfors and Driffill, and in accord with the prediction
made in Section 5.1), but a positive convex relationship for countries with low union
concentration. The relationship is statistically insignificant for countries with intermediate
degrees of union concentration.
(4) Union coverage and inflation are negatively related for countries with high and
intermediate degrees of union concentration, but positively related for countries with low
union concentration. (Recall our prediction of an ambiguous relationship in Section 5.1).
(5) Openness to trade reduces inflation in countries with medium and low union
concentration, but has no impact on inflation in countries with high union concentration.
7. Union Variables and Unemployment
7.1 Results for Full Panel of Countries
Table 6 presents the results of the unemployment regressions.  The explanatory variables
included in these regressions can be divided broadly into three groups: (1) central bank
independence (which partially controls for the state of the  macroeconomy); (2) variables
characterizing the wage bargaining institutions in an economy such as union density, union
coverage, union concentration and wage bargaining level; and (3) variables intended to
capture other aspects of a country’s labour market, such as the total tax wedge, employment
protection, unemployment benefit duration and replacement ratio, and the extent of active
labour market programs.
Column 1 presents the results from the “between” regression which uses only cross-
country variations in each of the independent variables. Just as in the corresponding inflation
regression, CBI exhibits a hump-shaped relationship with unemployment. However, contrary
to expectations, union density and unemployment have a U-shaped relationship while union
coverage is negatively correlated with the unemployment rate. In addition, unlike the
“between” inflation regression, even pure cross-country differences in union concentration
can explain a significant portion of differences in the mean unemployment rate between
countries. The relationship between union concentration and unemployment is a hump-shaped
one. Among the other labour market variables, employment protection and unemployment
benefit duration have a positive correlation with the unemployment rate, while more active
labour market programs and a higher benefit replacement ratio tend to reduce unemployment,
the last of which is a counter-intuitive result. One would expect that a higher benefit
replacement ratio to reduce the intensity of job search by the unemployed.
Almost all the above results are replicated in the full panel data estimation using
ordinary least squares (reported in column 2). The only exception is that union coverage now
loses its explanatory power. In addition, the level of bargaining exhibits a slightly convex but
clearly negative relationship with unemployment. That is, highly  centralized bargaining
systems appear to reduce unemployment, which is the result that gave rise to the corporatist
hypothesis and its associated literature.
The Hausman test statistic reported at the bottom of column 4 in the same table
indicates that the random effects (variance components) model should be rejected in favor of
the fixed  effects model. The estimated coefficients from the fixed effects estimation are23
reported in column 3; again, union density and unemployment exhibit a U-shaped relationship
while the relationship between unemployment and union concentration is a hump-shaped one.
Finally, the results from the autoregressive model (reported in the last column) are
almost qualitatively identical to those of the standard OLS model. The only important
difference is that the estimated coefficients for employment protection and benefit duration
now become statistically insignificant.
We note that the hump-shaped relationship observed between unemployment and
central bank independence are inconsistent with the  Cukierman-Lippi and  Velasco-Guzzo
models, which both predict an upward-sloping relationship.  Similarly, the hump-shaped
relationship between unemployment and union concentration is inconsistent with the
prediction of the Velasco-Guzzo model, which posits either a negative relationship between
unemployment and the inverse of the number of unions
13 (“centralization” in their parlance)
when the elasticity of substitution among different types is sufficiently small, or an U-shaped
relationship otherwise. Our results are, however, consistent with the prediction of the
Cukierman-Lippi model that unemployment and the inverse of the number of unions (1/n)
have a hump-shaped relationship when unions are sufficiently averse to inflation. (Their
model predicts a positive relationship when unions do not care much about price stability.) A
joint plot of unemployment, CBI and union concentration is shown in Fig.3 - compare these
with Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 in Velasco and Guzzo (1999), p.1336-37.
7.2  High-Union Concentration versus Low-Union Concentration Countries
As in the case with inflation, we divide our sample of 15 countries into three equal-
sized groups according to their index of union concentration, and proceed to jointly estimate
the effects of CBI and union variables on unemployment for all three groups. This is
implemented in OLS and GLS (using both the Fuller-Battase variance components model
14
and the Parks autoregressive model) by interacting dummies for the three groups with all
explanatory variables except union concentration. The results are reported in Table 9, and
may be summarized as follows:
(1) Central bank independence and unemployment exhibit a hump-shaped correlation for
countries in the intermediate union concentration group (see columns 2 and 3). Inflation
and CBI are uncorrelated for countries in the other two groups.
(2) Unemployment is hump-shaped with respect to union density in countries with high union
concentration, and U-shaped in countries with medium and low union concentration. In
the last case, however, the relationship is of statistical significance only when using the
random effects (variance components) estimator (column 3).
(3) There is a negative relationship between unemployment and the level of wage bargaining
in countries with high union concentration. The relationship is always statistically
insignificant in countries with low union concentration and significant in countries with
medium union concentration only when the random effects estimator is used.
(4) The effect of union coverage on unemployment in each of the three groups is not robust to
the use of alternative estimators.
                                                                
13 As explained in footnote 9, an increase in the number of unions, ceteris paribus, lowers our Herfindahl
index of union concentration.
14 This specification cannot be rejected  at the 10% level. The Hausman statistic is 10.67 with a p-value of
0.0992.24
8. CBI and the Impact of Union Variables on Macroeconomic Outcomes.
We now turn to the results obtained when the sample is divided into two groups according to
the degree of central bank independence in each country. Countries classified in the high-CBI
group are Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, USA, Canada and the Netherlands (in
descending order of independence). Countries classified in the low-CBI group are Sweden,
Finland, UK, Italy, France, Japan and Norway (again in descending order of independence).
The CBI index ranged from 0.42 to 0.69 for the former group, and from 0.17 to 0.29 for the
latter.
Table 10 reports the results from the inflation regression. The left half of the table
(columns 1 and 2) show the estimated coefficients for the autoregressive (Parks) model, while
the right half (columns 3 and 4) show their counterparts for the variance components (Fuller-
Battase) model. The results for the two models are qualitatively similar. The relationship
between inflation and CBI is humped-shaped in low-CBI countries but statistically
insignificant in high-CBI countries. Union density and inflation are hump-shaped in high-CBI
countries and monotonically positive in low-CBI countries. Union concentration and inflation
are U-shaped in high-CBI countries but statistically insignificant in low CBI countries.  The
wage bargaining level is negatively correlated with inflation in high-CBI countries and
positively correlated with inflation in low-CBI countries. The trade openness variable has a
negative correlation with inflation in high-CBI countries only in the autoregressive model.
The next table (Table 11) shows the corresponding results from the unemployment
regression. CBI and unemployment are  uncorrelated in high-CBI countries but positively-
correlated in low-CBI countries. Union density has a convex downward-sloping relationship
with unemployment in the low-CBI countries; the relationship is statistically insignificant in
the high-CBI countries. Union coverage is negatively correlated with unemployment in high-
CBI countries but positively correlated with unemployment in low-CBI countries. Union
concentration and unemployment are hump-shaped in high-CBI countries and monotonically
downward-sloping in low-CBI countries. The level at which wage bargaining takes place is
positively correlated with unemployment in high-CBI countries but  uncorrelated with
unemployment in low-CBI countries. In both groups of countries, the total tax wedge and
employment protection index are negatively and positively correlated with unemployment
respectively. However, the benefit replacement rate and unemployment are negatively
correlated in high-CBI countries but positively correlated in low-CBI countries. Conversely,
benefit duration and unemployment are positively correlated in high-CBI countries but
negatively correlated in low-CBI countries.
The Cukierman-Lippi model predicts that the higher CBI the larger the range of
“centralization” (or 1/n) levels (equivalent to our union concentration levels, as explained
earlier) for which further decentralization is beneficial in the sense that it is likely to reduce
both inflation and unemployment. Conversely, the lower CBI, the larger the range of levels of
centralization (concentration) for which further  centralization (concentration) is beneficial
since it reduces inflation and unemployment. Graphically, the upward-sloping portion of the
unemployment-centralization curve is more dominant when CBI is high, while the downward-
sloping portion is predominant when CBI is low. An increase in CBI is also expected to shift
the entire curve up.
15
                                                                
15 See Fig.3 in Cukierman and Lippi (1999), p.1409.25
A glance at Table 10 reveals that this prediction is clearly not borne out by our
inflation results. However, as can been seen from Table 11, the estimated coefficients for
union concentration in the unemployment regressions for high-CBI and low-CBI countries are
somewhat more consistent with the prediction of the Cukierman-Lippi model, in that the
relationship is largely upward-sloping for high-CBI countries and largely-downward sloping
for low-CBI countries.
16 The corresponding plots are shown in Fig. 4.
9. Union Concentration and Aggregate Supply Shocks
In this penultimate section, we examine whether variation in union concentration
explains the widely differing inflationary responses of OECD countries to the 1973-74 OPEC
oil price shock. To test this hypothesis, we create a counterfactual in which there were no
unanticipated supply shocks to raise average import prices between 1974 and 1976. For
generating the predicted values of inflation for this period, we used the Multi-Country (MC)
version of the FAIRMODEL. This model by Ray Fair consists of estimated structural
equations for 33 countries and estimated trade share equations for 44 countries. There are 328
stochastic equations and 1440 estimated coefficients in the MC model; the number of
endogenous and exogenous variables, not counting the trade shares, is about 4000. The
estimation technique used for all the countries is two stage least squares except when there are
too few observations to make the technique practical, whereupon ordinary least squares is
used. To generate predicted rates of inflation, we replaced actual average import price indices
for all countries in the model with values fitted to trends generated from 1971-73 historical
data. One caveat that should be noted about this simulation is that the parameters of the model
are estimated from data beyond the 1970s, and is thus vulnerable to the  Lucas critique.
Unfortunately, the model cannot be easily altered to address this problem and we have thus
far been unable to find a suitable alternative forecasting model.
In order to focus our attention on countries which are as similar as possible in all other
respects except for differences in their labour market structures and monetary institutions, we
restrict our sample to only 9 continental European countries (Austria, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland). We also chose as
parsimonious an empirical specification as possible, bearing in mind that we are working with
only 9 observations. From our results in Section 6.1, we decided to exclude the square of
union concentration.
The results are suggestive: Our estimates (shown in Table 12) indicate that central
bank independence is significantly correlated with the difference between actual and predicted
inflation rates for the year 1974; however, its effects on inflation fades away in 1975. Union
density and density squared have the correct signs in both 1974 and 1975, but become
statistically significant only in the latter year. The most intriguing finding is that union
concentration is at first insignificant in explaining unexpected inflation, but becomes
significant even at the 5% level by 1975. This observation is consistent with our hypothesis
that wage institutions affect the transmission of aggregate supply shocks to hikes in the
inflation rate. In the immediate aftermath of the shock, central banks with greater
independence were more successful in resisting the urge to accommodate the shock.
However, by the second year (when a significant fraction of wages would have been
                                                                
16 This result is however the exact reverse of that found by Cukierman and Lippi (1999) in their empirical
work (see column 5, Table C2).26
renegotiated), more concentrated unions in certain countries were better able to convince their
members to accept the reality of lower real wages, thereby allowing firms to institute smaller
price increases and bringing down actual inflation. Note that we used 1973 values for all other
explanatory variables to prevent the sharp, unexpected rise in inflation from feeding back into
central bank independence, union density and union concentration.
10. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of central bank independence, union density
and union concentration and other labour market variables on inflation and unemployment.
We also reviewed the existing empirical literature and theoretical models supporting our
belief that coordination failures in wage setting and bargaining are responsible for a
significant fraction of price inflation observed in developed economies. The extent of these
coordination failures, we argued, is in turn dependent on the union structures extant in these
countries.
While previous studies in this field have used subjective measures of  centralization
and corporatism to capture the degree to which a country’s wage setting institutions
ameliorate the effects of coordination failures, we have used a  Herfindahl index of union
concentration which is objective and captures much of the subtleties inherent in the
phenomena under study. In addition to union density, union coverage and wage bargaining
level, other variables used to characterize the labour market institutions in a country are the
total tax wedge, employment protection, unemployment benefit duration and replacement
ratio, as well as spending on active labour market programs. A trade openness variable was
also included as a proxy for the intensity of external competition faced by firms in product
markets.
Our results using panel data for 15 OECD countries from 1971 to 1990 show that
inflation exhibits a hump-shaped relationship with central bank independence and union
density, but a negative relationship with union concentration. Unemployment has a U-shaped
relationship with union density, but a hump-shaped relationship with union concentration and
central bank independence. These findings are robust to the use of alternative estimators and
assumptions on the structure of the error term. In addition to ordinary least squares, the model
was estimated using the “between”, fixed effects (“within”), two-way random effects and
autoregressive estimators. Interestingly, our full-panel inflation results fully support the
predictions of the Velasco-Guzzo (1999) model, while our full-panel unemployment results
partially support the predictions of the Cukierman-Lippi (1999) model and reject those of the
Velasco-Guzzo model.
Stratifying the sample into three groups by the degree of union concentration in each
country, we find that central bank independence, union density, union concentration and wage
bargaining level had very different impacts on inflation and unemployment for each of the
three groups. For example, the relationship between CBI and inflation is hump-shaped for
countries with high and low union concentration, but monotonic and negative for countries
with intermediate union concentration. On the other hand, union density and inflation exhibit
a hump-shaped relationship for countries with low and intermediate union concentration, but
an upward-sloping relationship for countries with high union concentration. When we divide
our sample by the degree of central bank independence, we again find considerable
divergence in the impact of labour market variables on inflation and unemployment in27
countries with highly independent central banks and in those that do not. As in the full
sample, the results from the unemployment regressions are more supportive of the
Cukierman-Lippi model than those from the inflation regressions.
Finally, we estimated the impact of central bank independence, union density and
union concentration on the unexpected rise in inflation arising from the 1973-74 OPEC shock.
Our regressions show that in the immediate aftermath of the oil price shock, greater central
bank independence is strongly correlated with smaller deviations of actual inflation from their
predicted values. Two years after the shock, the effects of central bank independence fade
away and are replaced by that of union concentration. These findings are consistent with our
hypothesis that greater union concentration inhibits the wage-price spiral set off by negative
aggregate supply shocks.28
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TABLE 1
Centralization, Corporatism and Union Concentration Rankings
for 10 OECD countries, 1971-85.




1 Austria Austria Austria
2 (UK) Norway Germany
3 Germany Sweden Netherlands
4 Denmark Denmark Norway
5 Norway Germany Sweden
6 Sweden Netherlands Denmark
7 Italy France Switzerland
8 Netherlands UK Italy
9 Switzerland Italy UK
10 France Switzerland France
TABLE 2






Inflation (%) 7.26 4.33 -1.40 27.20
Unemployment (%) 4.99 3.18 0.00 11.90
Central bank
independence
0.39 0.156 0.17 0.69
Union density 0.419 0.173 0.085 0.846
Union coverage 0.655 0.232 0.22 0.95
Union concentration 0.653 0.247 0.25 1.00
Bargaining Level 2.47 0.99 1.0 4.0
Total tax wedge (%) 50.15 11.76 28.70 70.70
Employment protection 9.47 5.20 1 20
Benefit replacement rate
(%)
58.07 17.07 20 90
Benefit duration (yrs) 1.98 1.24 0.5 4.0
Active labour market
programs
12.78 13.68 3.0 59.3
Openness 0.254 0.106 0.07 0.4832
TABLE 3






















Australia 9.5 5.9 0.450 1. 0.36 0.17 3
Austria 5.1 2.5 0.495 1 0.61 0.32 2
Canada 7.0 8.1 0.323 0.737 0.45 0.22 1.45
Switzerland 4.6 0.4 0.296 0.445 0.58 0.33 2
Germany 4.0 4.9 0.333 0.703 0.69 0.21 2
Denmark 7.9 6.4 0.666 0.627 0.50 0.32 3.2
Finland 9.3 4.3 0.638 0.457 0.28 0.26 2.75
France 8.0 6.7 0.160 0.322 0.24 0.18 2
UK 10.1 6.7 0.432 1 0.27 0.24 1.75
Italy 12.6 8.4 0.393 0.401 0.25 0.21 3.4
Japan 4.3 2.1 0.297 0.432 0.18 0.11 2
Netherlands 5.0 7.0 0.296 0.517 0.42 0.48 2.95
Norway 7.0. 2.4 0.529 0.696 0.17 0.43 3.65
Sweden 8.8 2.3 0.773 0.488 0.29 0.26 3.5
US 5.8 6.7 0.198 1 0.48 0.07 1.333
TABLE 4
Inflation, CBI and wage bargaining structure in 15 OECD countries, 1971-90.



























CBI squared ------ ------ ------ ------ -44.618 **
(-4.32)


















Union coverage 5.461 **
(4.42)





























































n 300 300 300 300 300
Adjusted R
2 0.1977 0.2307 0.2385 0.2648 0.3071
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t statistics. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5%
level. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.34
TABLE 5
Inflation, CBI and wage bargaining structure in 15 OECD countries, 1971-90.
Dependent variable: annual inflation























































































































n 15 300 300 300 300
Adjusted R
2 0.6640 0.3071 0.8541 ------ 0.2899
Hausman Test
Statistic




Notes: Figures in parentheses are t statistics. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5%
level. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.35
TABLE 6
Unemployment, CBI and wage bargaining structure in 15 OECD countries, 1971-90.
Dependent variable: annual unemployment rate



























































































































































n 15 300 300 300 300
Adjusted R
2 0.9980 0.5796 0.8889 0.2093 0.5885
Hausman Test
Statistic




Notes: Figures in parentheses are t statistics. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5%
level. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.36
TABLE 7



































0.411 0.357 2.4 0.31 7.75 7.7537
TABLE 8
Inflation, CBI and wage bargaining structure in 15 OECD countries (1971-90), grouped by
union concentration.
Dependent variable: Annual inflation rate







Hi (dummy for high
concentration group)
-17.405  (-2.12) -12.67  (-0.95)
Hi x CBI 113.152  (2.70) ** 87.396  (1.47)
Hi x CBI squared -163.29  (-3.25) ** -128.424  (-1.87) *
Hi x union density -1.104  (-0.03) 6.083  (0.50)
Hi x union density squared 98.205  (2.11) ** 71.736  (4.31) **
Hi x union coverage -29.34  (-6.25) ** -22.342  (-7.26) **
Hi x bargaining level 12.586  (3.01) ** 9.975  (5.64) **
Hi x bargaining level squared -2.587  (-3.07) ** -2.098  (-5.91) **
Hi x openness -10.292  (-0.87) -12.130  (-1.18) **
Med (dummy for high
concentration group)
229.073  (2.61) 212.384  (3.10)
Med x CBI -80.443  (-1.83) * -68.280  (-2.71) **
Med x CBI squared 29.394  (0.81) 18.259  (1.12)
Med x union density 85.725  (3.76) ** 84.171  (8.08) **
Med x union density squared -63.916  (-3.12) ** -64.105  (-6.72) **
Med x union coverage -225.190  (-2.72) ** -211.645  (-3.44) **
Med x bargaining level -0.422  (-0.07) 1.810  (1.28)
Med x bargaining level squared 0.254  (0.27) -0.220  (-0.92)
Med x openness -161.986  (-2.89) ** -154.300  (-3.18) **
Lo (dummy for high
concentration group)
-89.257  (-4.33) -75.053  (-5.64) **
Lo x CBI 535.599  (2.82) ** 529.525  (4.52) **
Lo x CBI squared -461.45  (-2.82) ** -435.614  (-4.26) **
Lo x union density 115.574  (7.14) ** 98.278  (7.91) **
Lo x union density squared -102.955  (-4.85) ** -74.678  (-5.39) **
Lo x union coverage 24.597  (6.26) ** 23.974  (6.98) **
Lo x bargaining level 15.540  (2.43) ** 9.099  (3.45) **
Lo x bargaining level squared -2.797  (-2.65) ** -1.597  (-3.28) **




Notes: Figures in parentheses are t statistics. * denotes statistical significance at the 10%
level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.38
TABLE 9
Unemployment, CBI and wage bargaining structure in 15 OECD countries (1971-90),
grouped by union concentration.
Dependent variable: Annual unemployment rate










Hi (dummy for high
concentration group)
0.747 (0.14) 4.195 (0.68) -7.760 (-0.34)
Hi x CBI 20.337 (0.84) 15.115 (0.61) 48.729 (0.50)
Hi x CBI squared -27.449 (-0.99) -24.754 (-0.92) -61.577 (-0.57)
Hi x union density 45.126 (2.86) ** 17.895 (1.97) * 57.969 (4.12) **
Hi x union density squared -83.029 (-3.31) ** -40.949 (-3.41) ** -81.865 (-4.40) **
Hi x union coverage 5.693 (1.88) * 2.406 (1.44) -0.703 (-0.11)
Hi x bargaining level -5.107 (-1.96) * -1.956 (-3.37) ** -3.680 (-2.13) **
Hi x bargaining level
squared
0.942 (1.79) * 0.393 (3.46) ** 0.681 (1.96) *
Med (dummy for high
concentration group)
28.956 (2.34) -13.433 (-1.65) -9.358 (-0.46)
Med x CBI 12.463 (0.79) 63.942 (3.23) ** 73.863 (1.84) *
Med x CBI squared -10.410 (-0.53) -67.940 (-3.27) ** -89.521 (-1.95) *
Med x union density -11.838 (-1.22) -10.722 (-1.29) -41.528 (-4.22) **
Med x union density squared 14.390 (1.32) 0.545 (0.09) 19.787 (2.21) **
Med x union coverage -23.877 (-2.24) ** 13.001 (1.64) 32.539 (1.58)
Med x bargaining level -4.833 (-1.33) 0.263 (0.56) -4.701 (-2.00) **
Med x bargaining level
squared
0.666 (1.12) -0.068 (-0.83) 0.728 (1.90)*
Lo (dummy for high
concentration group)
9.705 (1.77) 16.715 (5.75) 7.700  (1.00)
Lo x CBI -17.152 (-0.97) -37.031 (-8.01) ** 21.675 (0.75)
Lo x CBI squared 14.151 (0.65) 31.441 (7.02) ** -35.726 (-1.34)
Lo x union density -35.564 (-3.43) ** 4.645 (0.77) -35.877 (-3.83) **
Lo x union density squared 32.740 (2.72) ** -13.805 )-1.86) 25.990 (2.15) **
Lo x union coverage 3.801 (2.52) ** 6.918 (5.86) ** 5.831 (1.34)
Lo x bargaining level -0.522 (-0.13) -7.072 (-4.32) ** -1.436 (-0.53)
Lo x bargaining level
squared
0.740 (1.09) 1.387 (4.79) ** 0.398 (0.90)
N 300 300 300
Adjusted R
2 0.8920 0.8076 0.4106
Hausman test statistic ------ ------ 10.67
(p-value = 0.0992)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t statistics. * denotes statistical significance at the 10%
level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.39
TABLE 10
Inflation, CBI and wage bargaining structure in 15 OECD countries, 1971-90. Countries
grouped according to their CBI index.

















































































































n 140 140 140 140
Adjusted R









Notes: Figures in parentheses are t statistics. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5%
level. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.40
TABLE 11
Unemployment, CBI and wage bargaining structure in 15 OECD countries, 1971-90.
Countries grouped according to their CBI index.
Dependent variable: annual unemployment rate
Estimation method: GLS
Autogregressive Model (Parks)
































































Notes: Figures in parentheses are t statistics. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5%
level. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.41
TABLE 12
Deviation of Actual Inflation from Predicted Inflation, central bank independence, and wage-
bargaining structure in 9 OECD countries, 1974-1976.



































Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. * indicates statistical significance at the 10%
level. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.42
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FIG. 2
Plot of Inflation and Unemployment against CBI, Union Density and Union Concentration























































































































































































































3-D Plots of Inflation and Unemployment against CBI and Union Concentration.
Above: Inflation 3-D Plot (Full Sample) || Below: Unemployment 3-D Plot (Full-Sample)47
FIG. 4
Plot of Unemployment against Union Concentration for High-CBI and Low-CBI Countries.
Plot of Unemployment against Union 
Concentration












































































Wage Bargaining Systems in Selected OECD Countries (up to 1990)
17
Australia
Union Confederations: Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), Australian Council of Salaried
and Professional Associations (ACSPA), Council of Australian Government Employee Associations
(CAGEO), Australian Federation of Police Associations and Unions (AFPU), Australian Public
Service Federation (APSF), Australian Teachers’ Federation (ATF), Council of Professional
Associations (CPA)
Coverage: High.
Bargaining System: National Industrial Relations Commission set general principles for pay increases.
Industry-level bargains either followed these principles or had to be endorsed by the Commission. All
such bargains related to minimum rates. However, firm-level bargains could agree on ‘over-award’
pay increases.
Coordination: Employers’ federation generally weaker than union federation.
Austria
Union Confederations: Austrian Confederation of Trade Unions, 1945- .
Coverage
18: High.
Bargaining System: Industry-level agreements, which depended on approval by the union
confederation.




Union Conferderations: Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), American Federation of Labour-Congress
of Industrial Unions (AFL-CIO), Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU), Centre of
Democratic Trade Unions (CSD), Canadian Federation of Labour (CFL), Confederation of Canadian
Unions.
Coverage: Medium.
Bargaining System: More public sector bargaining than in the USA.
Co-ordination: Nil.




Union Confederations: Reformist Federation of Labour (FO), 1948- ; French Federation of Christian
Workers (CFTC), 1919- ; Democratic Federation of French Labour (CFDT), 1964- , General
Federation of Staff Employee Unions (CGC), 1944- ; National Federation of Unions in Education
(FEN), 1948- .
Coverage: High.
                                                                
17 This section is taken from Layard et al. (1991), pp.517-524. List of union confederations from Visser (1989).
18 This refers to the fraction of the labor force covered by collective wage bargains.49
Bargaining System: Industry-level bargains applying by law to all workers in the sector. Most pay
above this determined at employer’s discretion.
Coordination: Employers’ confederation had some influence. Unions divided between four
federations..
Incomes Policy: (Implemented in June 1982.) Wage and price freeze for three months followed by
strict public-sector pay limits, generally followed by private sector at least as regards minimum rates




Union Confederations: German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB), 1949- ; German Union of
White-Collar Employees (DAG), 1945- ; Christian Union Confederation (CGB), 1959- ; German Civil
Servants Federation (DBB), 1949- .
Coverage: High.
Bargaining System: Industry-level bargains in each region, frequently extended by law to all workers
in the sector. Firm-level bargains supplemented these but strikes at this level illegal.
Coordination: Informal talks within and between national employers’ organization and trade unions
federation. This led to a pattern settlement generally in the metal industry in one region, broadly
followed elsewhere. National industry-level union had to authorize any strike. Council of Economic
Experts and the five research institutes helped to create climate of opinion in  favor of wage
moderation.
Incomes Policy: (1966-77) “Concerted Action’. Tripartite guidance on wage limits. Unions withdrew
over ‘co-determination’. Indexation illegal.
Italy
Union Confederations: General Confederation of Italian Labour (CGIL), 1944- ; Italian Confederation
of Labour Unions (CISL), 1950- ; Italian Confederation of Labour (UIL), 1950- .
Coverage: High.
Bargaining System: Industry-level bargains applying by law to all workers in the sector. Firm-level
bargains supplemented these.
Coordination: Some employer coordination, especially regionally. Strike insurance by employers.
Union confederations had variable control over their members (more in 1980s).
Incomes Policy:
1976-78: ‘Historic compromise’ establishing full indexation in return for presumption of low
settlements and reasonable strike behavior.
1983: Agreement to alter calculation of COL.
1984: Government proposal for reduction of permitted degree of indexation in the ‘ scala mobile’.
Rejected by CGIL, union federation. Confirmed by plebiscite on 9 June 1985.
Japan
Union Confederations: General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, National Federation of Industrial
Organization, Federation of Independent Unions of Japan, Japanese Confederation of Labour,
Japanese Trade Union Confederation, Japanese Confederation of Trade Unions, National Trade Union
Council, Japan Trade Union Confederation.
Coverage: Medium (high in large firms, low in small firms).
Bargaining System: Firm-level bargains, synchronized in Shunto (Spring offensive).




Union Confederations: Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions (NVV), 1905-81 (merger with NKV to
form FNV); Dutch Catholic Trade Union Confederation (NKV), 1909-81 (merger with NVV to form
FNV); Confederation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV), 1981- ;  Center for Higher Civil Servants
(CHMA), 1917- ; Dutch Federation of Staff Associations (NCHP), 1966- ; Federation of White-Collar
Employee  Organizations (MHP), 1974- ; Employee  Organization (CRP), 1916- , Civil Servant’s
Center (AC), 1946- .
Coverage: High.
Bargaining System: Industry-level bargains applying by law to all workers in the sector. Firm-level
bargains supplemented these, but at this stage strikes are outlawed.
Coordination: Three federations of employers and three of unions. Since 1982, the Foundation of
Labour, a joint employer-union organization, proposes a general framework for pay.




Denmark: Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), 1898- ; Joint Council of Public Servants and
Salaried Employees Associations (FTF), 1952- ; Federation of Supervisory and Technical Staff
Associations (FR), 1953- ; Association of Unions of Lower Grade Public Servants (CO-1), 1953- ;
Central Organization of Professional Employees (AC), 1972- .
Finland: Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), Confederation off Salaried Employees
(TVK), Confederation of Technical Employees (STTK), Central Organization of Professional Workers
(AKAVA), Finnish Trade Union Federation (SAJ), 1960-69
Norway: Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), 1899- ; Federation of Civil Servants (EL), 1918-74
(joined AF per 1-1-1975); Federation of Professional Associations (AF), 1974- ; Federation of State
Employees (ST), 1923-76 (joined YS per 1-1-1977); Federation of Public Employee Unions (YH),
1965-76 (joined YH per 1-1-1977); Confederation of Occupational Unions (YS), 1976- .
Sweden:  Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), 1898- ; Central  Organization of Swedish
Workers (SAC), 1909- ; Central Organization of Salaried and Government Employees (TCO), 1944- ;
National Federation of Civil Servants (SR), 1917-73 (merged with TCO to form SACO-SR); The
Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO), 1947-74 (merged with SR to form
SACO-SR), The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO-SR), 1974- .
Coverage: High.
Bargaining System: National bargain between trade union federation and employers’ federation: one
bargain in Denmark, three in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Industry-level and firm-level bargains
supplemented these, but strikes were not allowed at firm level (because of peace agreements at higher
level). National unions had to agree to local claims. LO, national union federation, controls strike fund
nationally in Sweden.
Coordination: Strong employers’ and union federations,  e.g. powerful coordination after 1982
Swedish devaluation.
Mediation: In Denmark and Norway this was compulsory, and there was sometimes binding
arbitration.
Incomes Policies:
Denmark: Frequent legislative intervention setting ceiling on wage growth: 1982: wage freeze; 1983:
indexation suspended; 1985-87: legal wage norms.
Finland: Comprehensive tripartite incomes policy from 1968. Wage indexation opposed.
Norway: Frequent social contracts mainly in the 1970s. Firm-level wage bargaining prohibited in
1978-79 and 1988.51
Sweden: Minimal direct intervention, though occasional guidelines.
Switzerland
Union Confederations: Confederation of Swiss Trade Unions (SGB), 1880- ; Christian-National
Confederation of Swiss Trade Union (CNG), 1907- ; Swiss Federation of Protestant Workers (SVEA),
1920-82 (affiliated to CNG in 1982); Liberal Federation of Swiss Workers (LFSA), 1919- ; Central
Organization of Swiss White-Collar Employee Unions (VSA), 1918- .
Coverage: Medium.
Bargaining System: Mainly  firm-level. Mainly subject to industry-wide five- to six-year peace
agreements ruling out use of strikes. Multi-year settlements. Cost-of-living agreements negotiated at
the industry level.
Coordination: Strong employer coordination. Unions weak.
Arbitration: Important.
UK
Union Confederations: Trade Union Congress (TUC), 1868- .
Coverage: High (after including workers covered by statutory Wages Councils).
Bargaining System: Some industry-level bargains. Majority of private-sector workers covered by firm-
level bargains (sometimes building on industry-level bargains).
Coordination: Virtually none among employers. Ditto among unions.
Incomes Policy:
1972-74: Wage freeze (for six months); 4 per cent (for six months); 5 per cent plus extra if inflation
exceeded 7 per cent (which it did). Statutory.
1975-79: 6 pounds a week (1
st year); 5 per cent (2
nd year); 10 per cent (3
rd year); 5 per cent (4
th year). Supported
by TUC in first two years.
USA
Union Confederations: American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Unions (AFL-CIO),
American Federation of Labour (AFL), Congress of Industrial Unions (CIO), Assembly of
Government Employees (AGE), National Federation of Independent Unions (NFIU), American
Associationof Classified School Employees (AACSE).
Coverage: Low.
Bargaining System: Firm level.
Coordination: Nil, though some pattern within industries.
Incomes Policy:
1971: 90-day wage freeze, and controls lasting to 1974.
1978-9: Commission on Wage and Price Stability promotes pay and price standards (essentially
voluntary).53
Appendix B
Economic performance and the structure of collective bargaining (some recent findings)
Reproduced from OECD (1997).54
Appendix C
Table C1: Effect of CBI and union variables on inflation (p) in various models
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Table C2: Effect of CBI and union variables on unemployment (u) in various models
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centralization on u is
stronger at high levels
of centralization.
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between u and CBI.
Negative relationship
between u and CBI.56
Appendix D
Feasible GLS Procedures
Fuller-Battese Method (Variance Components Model)
In the Fuller-Battese implementation, we assume that the error term has the
decomposition
u e it i t it = + + n e
     i = 1, 2,… , N;     t = 1, 2, … , T




2. The linear model with this error structure is written in matrix
notation as
y = Xb + u
where
y= ( 11 y y y y y T N NT , ,..., ,..., ,..., )' 12 1 1
X x x x x x = ( 11, ,..., ,..., ,..., )' 12 1 1 T N NT
xit are p x 1 vectors of independent variables
b  is a p x 1 parameter vector
u =(u u u u u T N NT 11 12 1 1 , ,..., ,..., ,..., )'
The covariance matrix for the vector of random errors u can be expressed
V uu' I A B
A I J
B J I
= E( ) = +
=
=








where INT, IN, and IT are identity matrices of order NT, N, and T; and JN and JT are N x N
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where JNT is a NT x NT matrix with all elements equal to 1.
The estimators for variance components are obtained by the fitting-of-constants method
(Searle 1971) with the provision that any negative variance components is set to 0 for
parameter estimation purposes.
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- denotes the generalized inverse of A, C1 = M12, C2 = M12 + M1., and C2 = M12 +
M.2.
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The generalized leasts-squares estimation takes the following steps:
1.  Obtain the constants using the following estimators for variance components.
$ $ / $ $
$ $ / $ $
$ $ $ $ / $ $ $
a s s s
a s s s
a a a s s s s
e e n
e e e

























2.  Transform the variables using constants  $ , $ , $ , a a a 1 2  and  3 as follows:
y y y y y it it i t







= - - +




1 2 3 x x x x x
where  y y y i t .. . , , and  . are defined the same way as  x x x ..  and  , , . . . i t
3.    Regress  yit it
* *  on x  using OLS.
The estimated generalized least-squares (EGLS) estimator  $ b F and its standard error can
be obtained from the OLS estimator in step 3. The EGLS estimator can be represented in
matrix notation as
b F X'V X X'V y
-1 -1 -1 ) =( $ $
where
$
$ ) ) )
V M M M M -1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 =
( ( (
12 1. 2. ..
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Parks Method (Autoregressive Model)
In the Parks method, we consider a first-order autoregressive model in which the
random errors uit, i = 1, 2, … , N,    t = 1, 2, … , T, have the structure
E(uit ii
2) =s (heteroscedasticity)
E(u u it jt ij ) =s (contemporaneously correlated)













































The model assumed is first-order  autoregressive with contemporaneous correlation
between cross sections. We allow for contemporaneous correlation in the error term
across countries since it is conceivable that each central bank reacts to the policies and
actions of the other central banks.
In this model, the covariance matrix for the vector of random errors u can be expressed
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The matrix  V is estimated by a two-stage procedure, and  b is then estimated by
generalized least squares. The first step in estimating V involves the use of ordinary least
squares to estimate  b and obtain the fitted residuals, as follows:59
$ $ $ u y X =    -   bOLS
A consistent estimator of the first-order autoregressive parameter is then obtained in the
usual manner, as follows:
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Finally, the autoregressive characteristic of the data can be removed (asymptotically) by
the usual transformation of taking weighted differences. That is, for i= 1, …, N and t = 2,
…, T
y y u u it i i t itk i i t k
k
p
k it i i t - = - + - - -
=
- ￿ $ $ $ , , , , r r b r 1 1
1
1 X X c h
while for i = 1, 2, …, N and t = 1










1 1 1 - = - + -
= ￿ $ $ $ r b r r X
This system is written as
y u i N t T it itk k it
k
p
* * * , ,..., ; , ,..., = + = =
= ￿X             b
1
12 12
The second step in estimating the covariance matrix V is to apply ordinary least squares
to the preceding transformed model, obtaining
$
* u y X
* * *
OLS = - b





















EGLS then proceeds in the usual manner,
$ ( $ $ b P = X'V X X'V y
-1 )
-1 -1
where  $ Vis the derived consistent estimator of  V. For computational purposes,  $ b p is
obtained directly from the transformed model,
$ '( $ ) '( $ ) b p T T = ˜ ˜
-
-
- X I X X I y




where  $ $ .
, ,..., F =
= f ij i j N 1
Parks demonstrates that his estimator is consistent and asymptotically, normally
distributed with
Var( ) X'V X
-1 -1 $ ) ( b p =